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The Convergent Media Policy Moment1 
 
Terry Flew 
Creative Industries Faculty, School of Media, Entertainment, Creative Arts, Media and 





This paper will consider some of the wider contextual and policy questions arising out of four 
major public inquiries that took place in Australia over 2011–2012: the Convergence Review, 
the National Classification Scheme Review, the Independent Media Inquiry (Finkelstein 
Review) and the National Cultural Policy. This paper considers whether we are now 
witnessing a ‘convergent media policy moment’ akin to the ‘cultural policy moment’ 
theorized by Australian cultural researchers in the early 1990s, and the limitations of various 
approaches to understanding policy – including critiques of neoliberalism – in understanding 
such shifts. It notes the rise of ‘soft law’ as a means of addressing the challenges of 
regulatory design in an era of rapid media change, with consideration of two cases: the 
approach to media influence taken in the Convergence Review, and the concept of ‘deeming’ 
developed in the National Classification Scheme Review. 
 






A convergent media policy moment? 
 
The period from 2011–2012 has been an unusually active one in Australian media and 
cultural policy. Among the inquiries and reports that have emerged in this period have been: 
 
• The Convergence Review, an independent inquiry undertaken through the Department 
of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, which was asked to 
“review the operation of media and communications legislation in Australia and to 
assess its effectiveness in achieving appropriate policy objectives for the convergent 
era” (Convergence Review, 2012: 110). It released its Final Report in April 2012. 
• The Review of the National Classification Scheme undertaken by the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (ALRC). I was seconded from the Queensland University of 
Technology to lead this inquiry, and the final report, Classification–Content 
Regulation and Convergent Media (ALRC, 2012), was tabled in Parliament in March 
2012. 
                                                             
1 A version of this paper was presented to the Institute for Culture and Society Seminar Series, June 21, 2012. 
Thanks to the participants in that seminar for their questions and observations, to Stuart Cunningham and Adam 
Swift for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to David Rowe and Michelle Kelly for their 
contributions to revising the paper.  
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• The Independent Media Inquiry was established by the Minister for Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy, Senator Stephen Conroy, to review the 
adequacy of media codes of practice and related matters in September 2011. The 
Inquiry was chaired by Hon. Ray Finkelstein QC, and its Report was delivered to the 
Minister in February 2012 (Finkelstein, 2012). 
• A National Cultural Policy Discussion Paper was released by the Office of the Arts in 
August 2011, and received hundreds of submissions in response. The release of a 
Final Report was delayed by the decision to undertake an independent review of the 
Australia Council as the peak arts funding body (Review of the Australia Council, 
2012), and there is an expectation that it will finally be released in late 2012. 
 
The return of media and cultural policy as a source of major debates in Australia during 
2011–2012 was in some respects surprising. The period has seen the most sustained Federal 
government activity related to media and cultural policy since the early 1990s, when the 
Broadcasting Services Act (1992) and the Classification Act (1995) were legislated, and when 
the Keating Labor government presented its path-breaking Creative Nation (1994) national 
cultural policy statement. That period also saw a sustained debate about whether policy was 
constitutive of the media and cultural studies field, particularly in Australia, where the later 
works of Michel Foucault on governmentality were drawn upon to shed new light upon the 
role of government in the shaping of national cultures (Bennett, 1992; Cunningham, 1992; 
Flew, Hawkins and Jacka, 1994). But the forms of media and cultural policy activism of the 
early 1990s appears to be something undertaken a while ago, and scholarship once relevant to 
it seemed to have moved on to other fields such as copyright law, social media, anti-corporate 
online activism, digital innovation and creative industries. 
 
International literature on media policy has proposed that an earlier orientation towards 
pluralism and the public interest had been subverted by the rise of neoliberalism as a 
dominant ideology of globalizing capitalism that no longer considered itself to be tethered to 
the nation-state (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Hesmondhalgh, 2007; Freedman, 2008). Indeed, 
there typically seemed to be more activism around eliminating the residual claims of nation-
states to govern media content or to seek access to it. There appeared to be a consensus 
across the political spectrum that the combination of networked digital technologies, 
economic and cultural globalization, and the global market in media content enabled by new 
platforms and services have fundamentally eroded the structural bases of twentieth century 
mass communication media, and that we lived in something of a ‘post-policy’ global media 
environment, where nation-states and government agencies appeared as the enemies of global 
digital activist communities.2 
 
But as economic geographers have observed, the globality and statelessness of corporations is 
frequently overstated. Dicken (2003) noted that most of the world’s largest non-financial                                                              
2 The clearest manifestation of such developments in recent years would be the emergence of WikiLeaks. 
Describing itself as “an uncensorable system for untraceable mass document leaking” (Flew and Wilson, 2012: 
171), those involved in WikiLeaks, such as its founder Julian Assange, engaged in a practice of making state 
secrets available to global audiences in the interests of a self-defined doctrine of ‘radical transparency’. The 
philosophy of WikiLeaks was very much one of decentralized resistance that drew upon global ICT networks as 
a challenge to the centralized and unaccountable power of nation-states and government agencies, in a manner 
akin to the Deleuzean concepts of rhizomes and ‘nomadology’ (Flew and Liu, 2011; Flew and Wilson, 2012). 
The debate about WikiLeaks took an unusual turn in 2012 with the recommendation of the UK’s Supreme Court 
that Julian Assange should be extradited to Sweden to face sexual assault charges, and his own subsequent 
actions to seek political asylum in Ecuador. Perhaps indicating the limits of global cosmopolitan law, Assange’s 
supporters have demanded that the Australian Government do more to assist Assange as an Australian citizen. 
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corporations undertook 40–50 per cent of their activities in their ‘home’ countries: of the 16 
per cent who undertook more than 75 per cent of their activities outside their home countries, 
most were in the resources and extractive industries, or were based in smaller European 
nations, and were facing the question of whether their country of origin (for example, 
Belgium) or the European Union was their home market. I have argued that this is 
particularly the case with global media corporations (Flew, 2012). Most of the largest media 
corporations continue to conduct the bulk of their activities in their home market, particularly 
North American corporations such as Time-Warner, Disney and Viacom. The only media 
corporation with genuine claims to be global, rather than a national corporation with 
international operations, is News Corporation, with its cross-media operations spanning five 
continents, and which holds over 50 per cent of its assets outside North America. 
 
Moreover, the literature on the economic sociology of such corporations alerts us to the 
absence of institutional and policy convergence, as well as to the continuing significant 
differences in national business cultures. Meric Gertler (2003: 112) has observed that “the 
enduring path-dependent institutions of the nation-state retain far greater influence over the 
decisions and practices of corporate actors than the current prevailing wisdom would allow”. 
Even if we were to see News Corporation as a global media company, the Leveson Inquiry in 
the UK – established in June 2011 to assess the effectiveness of print media self-regulation in 
the UK – has made it clear that the company can be held to account at the national level, 
whether it be for the phone hacking allegations which initially prompted the Cameron 
Government to set up the inquiry, or concerns the wider influence of News International (its 
UK print division) over the British polity, as has been the more recent subject of 
investigation. Whatever the final outcomes of the Leveson Inquiry may be, it marks an 
important moment in the reassertion of the powers of the Parliament in relation to media 
conduct, and of national forms of regulation as they relate to multinational media companies. 
 
In the ALRC Review of the National Classification Scheme, the need for reform of 
classification laws and regulations was approached at two levels. First, the inconsistencies, 
anomalies and inflexible elements of the current scheme were acknowledged, and our 
assessment of these problems was widely shared among over 2,300 submitters who 
responded to the ALRC’s ‘Issues Paper’, released in May 2011. At a second level, it was 
argued that fundamental reform of media classification, as with all other aspects of media and 
communications policy, was necessitated by the challenges of media convergence. The 
concept of convergence was used here as an umbrella concept to capture eight macro-forces 
of transformation in the global media and communications environment. The following 
extracts from the ALRC’s final report (2012: 66–74) illustrate these macro-forces: 
 
1. Increased access to high-speed broadband Internet: As of December 2010, there were 
10.45 million active internet subscribers in Australia, of which 8.15 million were 
household subscribers and 2.3 million were business and government subscribers. 
Nearly 15.1 million Australians aged 14 or over (83% of the population) went online 
during the December quarter of 2010, and 71% of internet users went online at least 
once a day. Approximately 3.1 million Australians aged 14 or over accessed the 
Internet via a mobile phone handset during December 2010, as compared to 1.9 
million during December 2009. 
2. Digitisation of media products and services:…It is estimated that 60 hours of video 
are uploaded every minute onto YouTube, and four billion videos are viewed every 
day worldwide from that site alone [(News.com.au, 2012)]. In Australia, there are an 
estimated six million YouTube users, watching over 200 million videos per month. 
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The Apple iTunes store now sells almost 10 million songs per day, making it by far 
the major music retailer worldwide…At a more general level, Deloitte Access 
Economics estimated that in 2010, the direct contribution of the internet to the 
Australian economy was approximately $50 billion, or 3.6% of Australia’s Gross 
Domestic Product. 
3. Convergence of media platforms and services:…[For all media organisations,] digital 
content services are now very much at the heart of their operations, and it no longer 
makes sense to maintain platform-specific organisational practices…At the same 
time, media convergence has increased the tendency towards media 
globalisation…the [Apple] iTunes site attracted four times the number of video 
downloads of the largest Australian providers (ABC iView, Yahoo!7 and NineMSN), 
and…its viewers spent over 10 times longer on iTunes than on the equivalent 
Australian sites [(Telstra, 2011)]. 
4. Globalisation of media platforms, content and services:…At one level, it can be 
argued that media globalisation is not a new phenomenon. Hollywood movies and 
American television programs have been a feature of the global media landscape for 
most of the 20th century…[while] local audiences have frequently displayed a 
preference for culturally relevant local media content where it is available [(Tunstall, 
2008)]…What has changed has been the extent to which digital media content can be 
sourced, distributed and accessed from any point in the world to any other point in the 
world. This has led to the rise of content distributors such as YouTube, and media 
platforms such as Apple iTunes and Android Market, that sit across national 
boundaries [and regimes of jurisdictional authority]. 
5. Acceleration of innovation:…The World Intellectual Property Office [(WIPO)] has 
observed, for example, that the number of patent applications worldwide has grown 
from about 1 million in 1995 to 1.9 million in 2008, and the number of patents 
granted has grown from 450,000 in 1995 to 750,000 in 2008 [(WIPO, 2010: 33).] 
6. Rise of user-created content:…An important shift in the media associated with 
convergence is the rise of user-created content, and a shift in the nature of media users 
from audiences to participants [(Bruns, 2008; Leadbeater, 2008)].…The rise of user-
created content is associated with broader trends away from a 20th century mass 
communications model, characterised by large-scale distribution, media content 
largely produced and distributed by media professionals, and a clear distinction 
between media producers and consumers. The emergent 21st century framework is 
one of convergent social media, characterised by dramatically reduced barriers to user 
participation through easy-to-use Web 2.0 technologies, and the resulting blurring of 
the producer/consumer distinction as there is ubiquitous user-created content 
accessible across multiple media platforms [(Flew, 2012: 165)]. 
7. Greater media user empowerment: The rise of user-created content, and the shift in 
the nature of audiences towards a more participatory media culture, is associated with 
greater user control over media. This is partly related to a greater diversity of choices 
of media content and platforms, but [it is also related to] the ability to achieve greater 
personalisation of the media content that one chooses to access…[While] the capacity 
for more personalised media is strongly related to the internet…it is also increasingly 
characteristic of more traditional media platforms, such as the increasing number of 
Australian households with some form of personal video recorder (PVR). 
8. Blurring of public/private and age-based distinctions:…Historically, there has been 
more extensive regulation applied to the media which has been publicly available or 
distributed (cinema, radio and television) than towards print media (books, 
newspapers, magazines) whose distribution and consumption were considered to be 
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more private and personal in nature…While expectations that the media continue to 
meet community standards remain important, the distinctions between media 
distribution methods are now less clear-cut. Newspapers, magazines, audiovisual 
media content, music and film are increasingly distributed and consumed online, in 
environments that are both public in terms of the networked platforms from which 
they are accessed, and private in terms of their consumption in the home rather than in 
public places.…It is considerably more difficult to restrict access to online content 
than is possible for other media platforms [as measures such as age-verification are 
easily thwarted by the determined user]. 
 
In terms of policy and regulation, the key issue arising from convergence is the manner in 
which it breaks the link between media content and delivery platforms. Convergence points 
towards a shift from vertically-integrated industry ‘silos’ (print, broadcast, telephony, etc.), 
and the associated need for sector-specific regulation, to a series of horizontal layers of (1) 
infrastructure; (2) access devices; (3) applications/content services; and (4) content itself. 
 
In an overview of Australian broadcasting and telecommunications regulations undertaken 
for the Convergence Review, ACMA (2011) identified 55 ‘broken concepts’ in current 
legislation, including: the concept of ‘influence’ in broadcasting; the ‘Australian identity’ of 
media owners; the concept of a ‘program’ in broadcasting; the distinction between a ‘content 
service provider’ and a ‘carriage service provider’ in relation to the Internet; and regulations 
specifically applied to activities such as telemarketing or interactive gambling. At the core of 
these ‘broken concepts’ was the manner in which digital convergence is making media 
services and content increasingly independent of particular delivery technologies. Its central 
regulatory consequence is that “regulation constructed on the premise that content could (and 
should) be controlled by how it is delivered is losing its force, both in logic and in practice” 
(ACMA, 2011: 6). 
 
The Convergence Review concluded from such developments that not only was new media 
policy required, but a new approach to media policy was necessary, as: 
 
Convergence of media content and communications technologies has outstripped 
the existing media policy framework. Many elements of the current regulatory 
regime are outdated or unnecessary and other rules are becoming ineffective 
with the rapid changes in the communications landscape (Convergence Review, 
2012: 1). 
 
Such an approach should move away from a platform-based approach to regulation, towards 
what the ALRC referred to as “platform neutrality” whereby “in the context of media 
convergence…[there is a] need to minimise platform-based distinctions to the greatest degree 
possible, in order to maintain an adaptive regulatory framework that can be oriented towards 
future media developments” (ALRC, 2012: 75). 
 
 
Policy, politics and principles 
 
The easy part of a review of current legislation, in media and communications as in other 
policy fields, is that of identifying the problems with the current framework. Moreover, the 
public submissions process will amplify the evidence of approaches that are outdated, 
inconsistent, inflexible, not working, at odds with current community expectations, 
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inconsistently applied between industries, etc. Of the over 2,300 submissions that the ALRC 
received in response to its May 2011 ‘Issues Paper’, the clear message was that it was time 
for fundamental reform to media classification laws in Australia, and that what currently 
existed was “an analogue piece of legislation in a digital world” (Simon Bush, quoted in 
Australian Publishers Association, 2011: 5). This quote from the Telstra submission provides 
a good example of the general view of industry in particular: 
 
Despite its [sic] worthy underlying intent, successive Governments have 
responded to challenges to the system posed by rapid technological change with 
a series of issue specific regulatory responses. After more than a decade of 
incremental changes, the National Classification Scheme as it stands today is a 
complex arrangement of parallel and sometimes overlapping systems of 
classification…In this context, rather than seeking to address the issues with the 
classification scheme that have emerged as a result of rapid technological change 
with further ad hoc reforms…the ALRC should undertake a holistic examination 
of the National Classification Scheme with the objective of developing a new 
classification framework for the modern media environment (Telstra, 2011: 2). 
 
The more difficult issue, of course, is proposing an alternative framework. The issue here is 
not simply one of policy versus politics, or the rational-comprehensive or evidence-based 
approach undertaken by independent policy experts being thwarted by a prevailing political 
culture of incrementalism, elite bargaining or subordination of good policy ideas to the 
management of the 24-hour political news cycle by the ‘Hollow Men’ in Ministers’ offices 
(Althaus, Bridgman and Davis, 2007: 59–71). The point about fundamental reform is that it 
inevitably means going back to first principles. Both the Convergence Review and the ALRC 
Classification Review had to consider why media were regulated in the first place, and in 
both reviews there was considerable work undertaken through discussion papers and online 
consultation to identify core principles that should frame future legislation. It must be noted 
that this occurred in a context of fundamental disagreement about first principles and uneven 
levels of participation among different interest groups: the ALRC blog, for instance, received 
a lot of critical commentary on the notion that ‘protection of children’ was a worthy principle 
of a National Classification Scheme. 
 
One of the purposes behind a statement of principles, as identified in the Australian Public 
Service Commission (APSC) guidelines for ‘smarter policy’, is that it enables discussion of 
policy goals to be uncoupled to some degree from evaluation of the available policy 
instruments (APSC, 2009). It can also anchor the policy goals over time, as changes in the 
external environment (technological change, changing consumer demand, etc.) necessitate 
changes in the mix of policy instruments being used. Drawing upon submissions received, 
existing laws and codes, relevant international conventions and Australian public policy 
guidelines, as well as an online consultation process and the other media inquiries, the ALRC 
proposed eight guiding principles for reform that should inform the development of a new 
National Classification Scheme. The aim was to balance the potentially conflicting goals 
associated with community needs and expectations – safeguarding individual rights and 
freedoms at the same time as protecting children from potentially harmful media content, for 
instance – while also being more effective in the scheme’s application, and responsive to the 
challenges of technological change and media convergence. The report sets out its eight 
guiding principles in the following language (ALRC, 2012: 77–96): 
 
1. Australians should be able to read, hear, see and participate in media of their choice; 
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2. Communications and media services available to Australians should broadly reflect 
community standards, while recognising a diversity of views, cultures and ideas in the 
community; 
3. Children should be protected from material likely to harm or disturb them; 
4. Consumers should be provided with information about media content in a timely and 
clear manner, and with a responsive and effective means of addressing their concerns, 
including through complaints; 
5. The classification regulatory framework needs to be responsive to technological 
change and adaptive to new technologies, platforms and services; 
6. The classification regulatory framework should not impede competition and 
innovation, and not disadvantage Australian media content and service providers in 
international markets; 
7. Classification regulation should be kept to the minimum needed to achieve a clear 
public purpose; 
8. Classification regulation should be focused upon content rather than platform or 
means of delivery. 
 
The Convergence Review developed 10 guiding principles in its Emerging Issues paper, of 
which the key one was that “citizens and organisations should be able to communicate freely 
and, where regulation is required, it should be to the minimum necessary to achieve a clear 
public purpose”. The corollary of this principle was that ‘unnecessary regulation should be 
removed’ (Convergence Review, 2012: viii). The Review identified three enduring principles 
that should provide the cornerstone of ongoing Australian government regulation of media 
and communications to safeguard public interest concerns in the rapidly changing landscape. 
The Convergence Review expressed these three principles in the following manner (2012: 
viii): 
 
• Media ownership—A concentration of services in the hands of a small number of 
operators can hinder the free flow of news, commentary and debate in a democratic 
society. Media ownership and control rules are vital to ensure that a diversity of news 
and commentary is maintained; 
• Media content standards across all platforms—Media and communications services 
available to Australians should reflect community standards and the expectations of 
the Australian public; 
• The production and distribution of Australian and local content—There are 
considerable social and cultural benefits from the availability of content that reflects 
Australian identity, character and diversity [and in the absence of regulation] 
culturally significant forms of Australian content…would be under-produced. 
 
One aspect of current policy that is striking is the extent to which the search for alternatives 
to what is variously labelled ‘black letter law’, ‘hard-wired legislation’ or ‘command and 
control regulation’ (see, for example, APSC, 2009) draws upon behavioural assumptions that 
are recognizable to those familiar with the work of Michel Foucault on governmentality, or 
the role played by policy in shaping action at a distance (Rose, 1999). Some work in relation 
to media policy has picked up on this parallel between theories of governmentality and 
governmental practice. For example, Lunt and Livingstone (2012) have drawn upon theories 
of governmentality to understand the ‘citizen-consumer’ couplet as it developed in the UK 
with the passing of the Communications Act (2003) and the establishment of Ofcom as a 
convergent media regulator. Such developments are, however, difficult to capture in models 
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of the policy process that are couched in binary oppositions between the state and the market, 
public and private, or regulation versus deregulation. 
 
More commonly, media policy tends to be approached from two perspectives: the lapsarian 
and the libertarian. The lapsarian account contrasts a prior era in which a pluralistic and 
civic-minded approach to public policy prevailed to the current epoch, which is presented as 
one of ascendant and rampant neoliberalism. The Convergence Review Committee was 
invited by the Communications Minister, Senator Stephen Conroy, to “propose an alternative 
structure [for media regulation] that would encourage continued innovation and protect 
citizens’ interests in an age of convergent communication” (Convergence Review, 2012: 
111). This could be read by critics as simply being “based on an increasingly narrow and an 
instrumental commitment to market forces as the central dynamic of contemporary 
communications” (Freedman, 2008: 78), with the concept of ‘citizens’ interest’ being seen as 
a sop, an afterthought or – as with the ALRC National Classification Scheme Review – a 
measure to appease noisy morals campaigners and religious lobbyists. Indeed, such reviews 
have been interpreted by their academic critics as being grounded in neoliberal ideological 
principles, but also – perhaps paradoxically – as unlikely to amount to anything much. Martin 
Hirst’s commentary on the Convergence Review would be such an example: 
 
This report and its recommendations is the sort of Clayton’s reform we have 
come to expect from expensive government inquiries; fiddle with the 
terminology, shuffle the paper, look busy for a while, collect the cheque and 
quietly slip out the backdoor. 
 
The report is very business friendly – there’s nothing in here to frighten the 
market and nothing to excite or enthuse anyone campaigning for real and 
meaningful change. The only substantial achievement in this review is a 
recognition that convergence in media technologies and platforms means that 
there must be some sort of change. However, only mild change has been 
proposed; really it’s no more than tinkering (Hirst, 2012). 
 
It is notable that such contemporary critiques of neoliberalism in the policy domain strongly 
resemble earlier accounts, such as Michael Pusey’s work on the ‘economic rationalism’ of 
the 1980s, and can be themselves critiqued on similar grounds – namely, that they harken 
back to a ‘Golden Age’ that turns out to have never actually existed. One can note, for 
instance, that the Broadcasting Services Act was widely criticised for selling out ‘public 
interest’ principles to market doctrines, even if the early 1990s has now been presented as a 
‘Golden Age’ of principled public interest interventions in media and cultural policy (see, for 
example, Turner, 2012). As Ian Hunter previously noted in relation to Pusey’s work, the 
practical effect of such an account can be one of “divorcing itself from the social machinery 
in which cultural attributes have been formed as objects of knowledge and administration” 
(Hunter, 1988: 88). 
 
The libertarian position is interesting in that it has more momentum in this field, with the 
Internet being understood as the ‘technology of freedom’ that Ithiel de Sola Pool identified 
back in the early 1980s (Pool, 1983), which will roll back regulation in relation to all other 
media, even if national governments attempt in vain to stem this historical tide. The 
submission of Internet activist Mark Newton to the Convergence Review gives a sense of this 
position: 
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The Convergence Review is suffering from the same problems as the ALRC’s 
Classification Review, in that it’s searching for local provincial regulatory 
responses to a global phenomenon. By casting ‘convergence’ as an Australian 
media issue which requires an Australian regulatory response, it’s easy to predict 
that the results of the review will be obsolete by the time they’re published, 
overtaken by global developments which pay scant attention to Australian 
regulators (Newton, 2011). 
 
Rather than view these reports from a lapsarian or libertarian perspective, or to accuse them 
of either doing too little or trying to do too much, I want to consider some of the challenges 
presented by innovating in the area of regulatory design. One of the difficulties with the 
push/pull between neoliberal critiques of the capitalist market on the one hand, and 
libertarian critiques of the ‘nanny state’ on the other, is that we tend to work with a 
quantitative model of regulation, i.e., more market/less state, or more state/less market (or 
less freedom from a libertarian perspective). 
 
In the critical accounts of neoliberalism, this is overlaid with what Clive Barnett (2005) 
identifies as a two-dimensional model of power, where many of the more interesting 
propositions arising out of the later work of Foucault – such as the paradoxes of freedom in 
liberal societies – have been squeezed out by the reinsertion of these ideas into traditional 
Marxist theories of power. The result is a “trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into 
the Marxist narrative of ‘neoliberalism’ [which] sets up a simplistic image of the world 
divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion” (Barnett, 2005: 10). 
When this is added to the propensity for critics of the neoliberal present to idealise a past 
‘Golden Age’ of progressive and pluralistic public policy, it is not surprising that one would 
find here little but ‘tinkering’, or even ‘fiddling’, perhaps while Rome – or in this instance the 
pluralistic public sphere – burns. 
 
By contrast, the academic literature on regulation makes little reference to a state versus 
markets dichotomy, whether in the form of “a motivated shift away from public-collective 
values to private-individualistic values” (Barnett, 2005: 8), as posited in theories of 
neoliberalism, or in terms of the rise of a ‘nanny state’, as feared by libertarians. Rather, both 
states and non-state actors are seen as being intertwined in complex regulatory regimes, 
where there are interdependencies between actors. Markets are seen as inherently regulated or 
regulatable spaces under what John Braithwaite terms ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Braithwaite, 
2008). Contrary to the parable of a neoliberal state that is being progressively “hollow[ed] 
out” by anti-statist ideologues: 
 
Markets…have tended to become more vigorous, as has investment in the 
regulation of market externalities. Not only have markets, states, and state 
regulation become more formidable, so has non-state regulation by civil society, 
business, business associations, professions and international organisations. 
Separation of powers within polities have [sic] also become more varied, with 
more public-private hybridity (Braithwaite, 2008: 26–27). 
 
 
The radicalism of regulatory design 
 
Rather than seeing these reviews as essentially business-as-usual in media policy, as a 
continuation of a flawed neoliberalism or a last-gasp stand against the ubiquity of unregulated 
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global Internet content, I want to consider the argument made by Peter Leonard (2012) that 
there is a degree of regulatory radicalism in the approach taken to media in the reviews. 
Leonard suggests four areas in which the Convergence Review is radical, explaining in part 
the negative media commentary that the report received on release, even though its tenor is 
generally deregulatory, and is not politically partisan: 
 
1. Radicalism through scope: aiming for consistency of regulation across media 
platforms is radical in terms of twentieth-century media policies, which tended to be 
platform-specific, and in relation to developments internationally; 
2. Radicalism through regulatory design: there is a proposed move away from 
Parliamentary legislation and towards regulator discretion in the setting and 
enforcement of regulations, which would change relations between the Minister and 
their Department, regulators, and key media players, who have traditionally focused 
on Ministers as the locus of power in the field; 
3. Radical selectivity: the concept of a Content Service Enterprise (CSE) is developed by 
the Convergence Review as the basis for identifying media organizations that 
continue to be of influence, and hence subject to greater degrees of regulation, in a 
way that is tied to their audience reach and revenue base rather than their delivery 
platform; 
4. Radicalism by encroachment: the Convergence Review identifies the ability to control 
access over content as a potential new competition bottleneck, proposing that the new 
convergent media regulator, rather than the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), be the primary agency for addressing such concerns. 
 
In noting Leonard’s comments, I was reminded of how the paradoxes of regulation kept 
emerging for each of the media inquiries in question. For the Convergence Review, its 
challenge was how “to promote consistency between platforms while being deregulatory 
where possible” (Convergence Review, 2012: 50). It had to do so in the context of both its 
own principles-based approach that identifies ownership and control, community standards 
and local content as ongoing issues, and a situation where not only do significant platform-
based distinctions prevail (for example, broadcasting is highly regulated and the Internet is 
for the most part not regulated: where does that leave IPTV or web-based catch-up services?), 
but where the development of new services within platforms creates its own anomalies.3 
 
For the National Classification Review, the challenge was how to achieve platform neutrality 
in the classification of similar media content without simply extending the rules developed 
for one media platform to another. In doing this, we had to grapple with the paradox of an 
Australian community generally happy (albeit with some notable exceptions) with the 
reduction of the amount of material that is censored or banned compared with previous 
decades, but which continues to value the informational role attached to media content 
classification. The ACCC pointed out that “the availability of adequate information for 
consumers to make informed choices is an important characteristic of a competitive 
industry”, and that “an effective and consistent classification system is one possible tool to                                                              
3 An example is provided by the digital multichannel services that have operated in Australia since 2009. In 
December 2011, the five main free-to-air television channels accounted for 54.9 per cent of the capital city TV 
audience, the 10 digital channels accounted for 26.5 per cent, and the 200+ pay TV channels accessible through 
FOXTEL and AUSTAR for 18.6 per cent. Rules pertaining to local content and time-zone restrictions apply 
almost exclusively to the main free-to-air TV channels, but they account for only 55 per cent of viewing activity 
in the 30 per cent of Australian homes that access a pay TV service, and 67 per cent of viewing in the 82 per 
cent of Australian homes with digital television (ALRC, 2012: 73). 
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achieve this” (ACCC, 2011: 2, 1–2), while the Australian Children’s Commissioners and 
Guardians (ACCG) observed that “for the classification system to meet its objectives it must 
be, and must be seen to be, reliable by the community” (ACCG, 2011: 5). 
 
In addressing the limitation of news media regulation as it currently exists in Australia, the 
Finkelstein Review recommended the establishment of a government-funded statutory 
regulator to be called the News Media Council to take over the functions of the Australian 
Press Council, and also the functions of the ACMA that related to news and current affairs. It 
proposed that the News Media Council would be neither a government regulator nor a self-
regulatory industry body, but rather a co-regulatory hybrid mechanism engaging in what the 
Report terms ‘enforced self-regulation’: “an independent system of regulation that allows the 
regulated parties to participate in the setting and enforcement of standards (as is presently the 
case), but with participation being required, rather than voluntary” (Finkelstein, 2012: 287). 
The Finkelstein Review argued that the enforced self-regulation model would be in line with 
provisions that currently operate in Australian broadcasting, where industry bodies develop 
and administer codes of practice as required under government legislation, with the regulator 
having the powers to oversee and enforce compliance with these regulatory codes. 
 
Now ‘enforced self-regulation’ may sound like the worst of all worlds, upsetting both 
neoliberals and their critics alike. But something that needs to be borne in mind about 
regulation, at least as it is understood at a conceptual level, is that the concern is less with 
regulatory instruments and agencies than with their impacts upon the behaviour of regulated 
entities. As Arie Freiberg observes in The Tools of Regulation: “it is the objective or the 
effectiveness of the intervention, not its form, that is important” (2010: 4). Drawing upon a 
variety of definitions of regulation that prioritize the production of the desired regulatory 
outcome over the means of achieving it, Freiberg defines regulation as “an intentional 
measure or intervention that seeks to change the behaviour of individuals or groups” 
(Freiberg, 2010: 4). He outlines four analytical and practical consequences of such a 
definition of regulation: 
 
1. Regulatory actions have a purposive and intentional dimension: there is a meaningful 
relationship between regulatory goals and actions, and actions are intended to solve 
recognizable problems or move towards desired social outcomes in a conscious – and 
typically measureable – way; 
2. Government regulation is only one element of regulation: just as power is dispersed 
among social institutions, the capacity to regulate exists among both government and 
non-government institutions, including government regulation undertaken through 
non-government bodies; 
3. “Regulation is not limited to laws or rules”: Freiberg identifies a range of regulatory 
instruments not primarily based in legislation including market-based instruments; 
regulation through contracts or procurement requirements; licensing, registration and 
accreditation; regulation through design rules (physical, environmental, process) or 
through the architecture or ‘code’ underlying technologies; and informational 
regulation, including performance indicators and credit ratings; 
4. “Regulation is not just restrictive or coercive; it can also be constitutive, facilitating 
and enabling” [Freiberg cites Karen Yeung’s Securing Compliance at this 
observation]. Regulation can make things happen, as well as stop things from 
occurring – importantly, it can create and shape markets as well as regulate the 
conduct of participants within already existing markets (2010: 4–5). 
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The revisiting of 20-year-old legislation in the context of radical technological and industry 
change raises the question, not only of the need for new legislation, but the effectiveness of 
legislative approaches where the only certainty in the media field is that of constant change. 
The pros and cons of legislative approaches (the ‘black letter law’, ‘hard-wired legislation 
and ‘command and control regulation’ mentioned above) are widely discussed in the policy 
literature (APSC, 2009; Freiberg, 2010: 182–83). The advantages are: 
 
• Legal certainty for citizens and market participants; 
• Clear enforcement provisions for those who are in breach of the law; 
• Recognition of the sovereignty of Parliament as the elected representatives of the 
people. 
 
The disadvantages of this legislative approach are considered to be: 
 
• The lack of flexibility in adapting laws over time can lead to it becoming out-dated, 
counter-productive and an obstacle to innovation; 
• The perpetual need for more regulation in order to adapt laws to changing 
circumstances; 
• The time lags involved in making and amending legislation; 
• Legislation may be poorly equipped to deal with complex problems, and may promote 
an adversarial relationship with the subjects of the legislation; 
• Compliance costs may be high for both regulators – as it requires an enforcement 
infrastructure that will often be quasi-legal in nature – as well as those subject to 
regulation; 
• The adversarial relationship promotes an industry culture of minimal compliance, 
with no incentives to innovate in meeting the requirements. 
 
At the same time, while the Convergence Review and National Classification Scheme 
Review are being driven in some instances by the ‘broken concepts’ of broadcasting, 
telecommunications and classification legislation (ACMA, 2011; ALRC, 2012: 56–59), the 
Finkelstein Review came out of a widely-held perception of the failures of print media self-
regulation. The question of hybrid forms of ‘soft law’, which has its origins in international 
law where there has not been a central government able to enforce norms or rules, has come 
to be more significant in regulatory practice: 
 
At the borderline between the public and private, between law and non-law and 
between self-regulation, co-regulation and government regulation lies a range of 
rules, instruments, rulings, guidelines, codes and standards that occupies a very 
large part of the regulatory terrain (Freiberg, 2010: 186). 
 
It is generally agreed that where law is both produced and enforced by non-state actors, as 
with the Codes of the Australian Press Council, then it truly is ‘soft’, but where it is 
combined with some scope for enforcement by state agencies, as with co-regulatory 
agreements, then it starts to move further along a spectrum towards direct government 
regulation, but with fewer of the issues of inflexibility, enforcement costs and lack of 
timeliness associated with formal legislation. Drawing on the work of several other writers, 
Freiberg (2010: 187–88) identifies the potential advantages of soft law as including: 
 
• Can be applied more quickly and less expensively than legislation; 
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• Can provide more discretion to the regulator; 
• Can be more flexible and adaptive to changing circumstances; 
• Can allow for non-technical language to be used that can make the regulations more 
comprehensible to those engaged with the process; 
• Can allow for a broader range of interpretation and a degree of trial-and-error in 
application; 
• Can encourage industry innovation in meeting regulatory requirements or promoting 
behavioural change; 
• Can encourage a more cooperative and less adversarial relationship between 
government and the regulated industries; 
• Can provide cheaper and faster dispute resolution procedures and means to achieve 
regulatory compliance. 
 
The potential disadvantages of soft law include: 
 
• Lack of precision and clarity for potentially affected parties; 
• May lack credible means of enforcement, and hence lack legitimacy with the wider 
public; 
• May lack legitimacy as it has been prepared with industry itself being involved, rather 
than by elected legislators; 
• May be poorly drafted, or difficult for lay people to access. 
 
 
Soft law in practice: Influence and deeming 
 
I will conclude with a consideration of two issues arising in the inquiries where attempts to 
establish a clear-cut legislative foundation for addressing the issue in question will prove 
difficult: the question of media influence, and the deeming of classifications developed 
overseas to apply within Australia. In both instances, ‘soft law’ options have been advanced 
as alternatives to ‘command and control regulation’. 
 
Influence 
One clear implication of convergence is that it blurs platform-based conceptions of a ‘market’ 
and an ‘industry’. This presents a considerable challenge for media policy, as we have 
traditionally drawn upon a clearly delineated notion of markets and industries in order to 
establish where concentrated ownership, and hence market power, may lie. Market power – 
and the related concept of market failure – provides well-established rationales for 
government intervention. This has been in both the direct sense of applying laws that set 
limits to the concentration of ownership within an industry/market, but also in the less direct 
sense that monopolistic or oligopolistic markets generate ‘market rents’ for participants, 
which may be redistributed for pro-social purposes through a series of quid pro quos. In 
Australia, the obvious case in point is the relationship between limits on the number of 
commercial broadcasting licences, the oligopolistic market that results, and the application of 
quotas for Australian content in the areas of locally-produced drama, children’s programming 
and documentaries (Flew, 2006). While the Productivity Commission famously condemned 
the quid pro quo regime in its 2000 report as “inward looking, anti-competitive and 
restrictive” (Productivity Commission, 2000: 6), political forces have allowed it to continue 
even as its original grounding in spectrum scarcity has manifestly disappeared. The 
Convergence Review also notes that the proposition that more regulations should apply to 
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‘broadcasting services’ than to other media because it makes use of spectrum is outdated, and 
the claim that it is more influential or has a wider reach than other media is increasingly 
tendentious (Convergence Review, 2012: 5–6). 
 
As noted above, the Convergence Review addresses this conundrum with the bold concept of 
Content Service Enterprises (CSE). It is proposed that the focus of regulation shift towards 
“significant enterprises that produce professional content to Australians” (Convergence 
Review, 2012: 10). The distinguishing features of CSEs – which would be the primary focus 
of ownership and control, local content and community standards regulations – are defined 
by the Convergence Review as follows: 
 
• They have control over the content that is supplied, i.e., it is professionally-produced 
media content; 
• There are a large number of Australians who use or access that content; 
• The enterprise derives significant revenue from supplying that content to Australians. 
 
The view is taken that Australians continue to expect regulations to apply to the largest and 
most influential providers of media content in areas such as: 
 
• A public interest test in relation to changes in ownership and control; 
• Classification information about content and access restrictions where appropriate; 
• Community expectations concerning fairness, accuracy and transparency in their 
reporting of news and information; and 
• Contributing to the overall level of local content production, whether through: 
- investing a percentage of their Australian market revenue in new Australian 
drama, documentary and children’s content; or through 
- contributing to a convergent content production fund administered by a 
government agency, and funded by a mix of contributions, direct government 
appropriations, and spectrum fees paid by radio and television broadcasters. This 
agency could invest in content such as games, online-only content or music, as 
well as highly localized content production. 
 
Deeming 
In considering the future of media classification in a convergent media environment, the 
ALRC noted that there is only limited demand for classification below certain threshold 
levels. While there is continued consumer value attached to classification categories below 
those where content may be restricted, the function is largely an informational one, as with 
parents seeking information about media content that is suitable for their children. The ALRC 
took the view that content that is below the level of R18+ is not expected to be classified, 
except in the specified cases of feature films, broadcast television and computer games. In 
relation to the increasingly globally-sourced nature of digital media content, the ALRC 
explored the scope that exists for deeming provisions to be applied to content classified 
elsewhere (ALRC, 2012: 164–170). In the games area, for example, two widely-used 
classification systems are the Entertainment Software Ratings Board (ESRB) classifications 
in the United States, and the Pan European Games Information (PEGI) system operating in 
the European Union. As games circulate in a global market, and as the shift from console-
based to online and mobile gaming is dramatically reducing the time spent getting games to 
market, the ALRC has recommended that the Federal government consider deeming such 
content to have an equivalent Australian classification where it has been classified through an 
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approved system. It can be noted here that about 99 per cent of games played by Australians 
are produced outside of Australia, and all Australian games developers produce for an 
international rather than a domestic market, so there is little basis within the industry itself for 
a distinct set of local classification standards. 
 
The other area where deeming questions arise relates to applications, including games, 
accessed from global online ‘stores’ such as the Apple iTunes Store or Google Market. The 
challenge here is that while a moratorium of two years was placed on a decision to classify 
‘apps’ in 2011, there is no prima facie reason why games in the form of apps should be dealt 
with differently to console-based games. Ongoing negotiations with these global platforms 
are likely to be a key part of any future national classification scheme, and the ALRC has 
identified merit in the convergent media regulator working with such providers on 
classification guidelines in order to provide greater certainty for content developers seeking 
to make their digital products available worldwide. Such an application of soft law would 
replace the current, widely criticized, legislative approach to games classification that has 
evolved since the Classification Act identified computer games as a form of ‘publication’ 
rather than as digital content. 
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